The cognition of randomness consists of perceptual and conceptual components. One might be able to discriminate random from non-random stimuli, yet be unable to identify which is which. In a series of experiments, we compare the ability to distinguish random from nonrandom stimuli to the accuracy with which given stimuli are identified as "random." In a further experiment, we also evaluate the encoding hypothesis according to which the tendency of a stimulus to be labeled "random" varies with the cognitive difficulty of encoding it (Falk and Konold, 1997). In our experiments, the ability to distinguish random from non-random stimuli is superior to the ability to correctly label them. Moreover, for some stimuli, difficulty of encoding fails to predict the probability of being labeled "random," providing evidence against one version of the encoding hypothesis.
Introduction
How people understand randomness has been a question of longstanding interest in psychology. The ability to apprehend randomness seems fundamental to cognition since it involves noticing structure, or the lack thereof, of events in the world (Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar, 1991 ). Yet in past research, the verdict on people's understanding of randomness has tended to be negative, finding that misconceptions such as the gambler's fallacy and the over-alternation bias are seemingly widespread (Wagenaar, 1972; Kahneman and Tversky, 1972 , but see Nickerson and Butler, 2009 ; for reviews see Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar, 1991; Oskarsson et al., 2009) . the specific details of the task (e.g., number of possible outcomes, length of the sequence to be generated, degree to which the sequence remains accessible to participants), as well as of the tests for randomness applied in analysis varied so widely that Wagenaar (1972) concluded for the 15 studies he reviewed that there is no way of combining the results into one coherent theory (pg. 69). In addition, researchers have employed not only a range of judgment tasks, but also prediction tasks (Edwards, 1961) , memory tasks (Olivola and Oppenheimer, 2008) , and competitive games (Rapoport and Budescu, 1992) . Thus, there is no canonical way of examining people's understanding of randomness, though judgment tasks have probably been most prevalent.
In the context of judgment tasks, there has also been considerable variation with regard to the materials used, in particular, how they were generated and what kind of random process they were taken to represent. Many studies have focused on unbiased coins as the prototypical random process, and presented participants with sequences of coin tosses. It thus seems desirable to examine a broader range of materials. The present studies make use of two very different kinds of stimuli: randomly tiled visual arrays (Julesz, 1962) , and dynamic random walks.
The theoretical definition of randomness is difficult (Beltrami, 1999; Nickerson, 2002) , because random generating sources can give rise to outputs that do not look random (e.g., uniform runs), and non-random sources can generate outputs that look random. Consequently, there are formal definitions of randomness based on the nature of the generating process, and ones based on the nature of the output itself. In light of this, not all past studies have operationalized randomness in reasonable ways (for extensive critiques, see Ayton et al., 1989; Nickerson, 2002) . For example, asking participants to generate a random sequence such as "one might see from an unbiased coin" requires participants to both mirror a random generating source and generate an output that looks "random" -even though these two notions are not identical. Given such instructions that are, at best, ambiguous and, at worst, incoherent, it is unclear whether resultant errors and biases should be attributed to participants or experimental instructions.
Our terminology in this paper is faithful to a "process" rather than "product" conception of randomness (see Eagle, 2012; Earman, 1986 for discussion). In our usage, a "random" stimulus (or pattern) is an object that has been produced by a random process. Non-random stimuli are defined as productions from a distorted random source. Importantly, our instructions to participants in the tasks examining their perception of randomness make no reference to the terms random and randomness. In probing their conceptual understanding of randomness, we provide no definitions or examples, thus leaving it entirely up to the participants how they interpret the term, in order to ensure that it is their own conception of randomness that we are studying.
More specifically, we used the following operationalizations: Assuming a random source R and a non-random source N we take an observer's proficiency at discriminating R from N to be the probability of correctly affirming whether a given pair of stimuli were both produced by R versus one by R the other by N. The observer's proficiency at identifying R and N is understood to be the probability of correctly labeling the sources of two stimuli, one from R the other from N.
A natural hypothesis is that discrimination proficiency predicts identification proficiency, in other words:
(1) Hypothesis: The probability of correctly identifying stimuli from R and N coincides with the ease of distinguishing between the two sources.
The accuracy of (1) might be compromised by a pervasive bias in people's concept of "random." Indeed, it is well known that strings of bits that alternate slightly more than expected on the basis of random generation are likely to be labeled as random (Lopes and Oden, 1987; Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar, 1991; Falk and Konold, 1997; Nickerson, 2002) . Likewise, attempts by untutored individuals to produce random sequences result in too many alternations, thus, in runs that tend to be too short (Wagenaar, 1972; Kahneman and Tversky, 1972; Baddeley, 1966) . The alternation bias, however, might have a discrimination counterpart if strings with short runs are relatively difficult to distinguish from products of R. The two biases might thus be balanced, ensuring the truth of (1). In sum, only direct comparison of discrimination versus identification can determine the relation between them.
Our experiments involved binary outcomes. In order to produce random bits (each with equal probability of being 0 or 1), we exploited the MATLAB (pseudo)random number generator. Reliance on this popular (albeit imperfect) process allows us to avoid difficult questions about the definition of "random." (Even the most popular theories of "infinite random sequence" are open to objection; see Lieb et al., 2006; Osherson and Weinstein, 2008.) Regarding "nonrandom," there are many ways to distort a random process. To explain the approach taken here, let x ∈ [0, 1] be given. A bit string S is called "switch(x)" if and only if it was generated by the following stochastic algorithm:
Algorithm: Set the first bit of S randomly. Suppose that the nth bit of S has been constructed. Then with probability x the n + 1st bit of S is set equal to the opposite of the nth bit; with probability 1 − x the n + 1st bit of S is set equal to the nth bit. The sequence S may be carried out to any length.
Thus a switch(1) sequence consists of perfectly alternating bits, and a switch(0) sequence is homogeneous. In both cases, the first bit (chosen randomly) controls the rest. A switch(.5) sequence is fully random. The expected proportion of alternations in a switch(x) sequencecalled the "switch rate" -is obviously x. It can be seen that for x < 0.5, switch(x) sequences have longer runs than expected from a random source, whereas for x > 0.5 the runs are too short. Note that the expected proportion of 1's (and of 0's) in a switch(x) sequence of sufficient length is one half, for all x ∈ (0, 1]. Thus, the first-order entropy of a switch(x) string does not depend on x (except if x = 0), and is maximal. In contrast, second-order entropy -defined over the relative frequencies of 00, 01, 10, and 11 in a given string -declines as x deviates from .5. But this does not lead us to rely on second-order entropy as a measure of objective randomness since we adopt the view (described above) that a bit string is random provided that it is produced by a random process, whatever the character of the string (e.g., all zeros). Note, moreover, that the string 00110011001100110011001100110 has maximal second-order entropy (the four binary patterns are equally represented) yet exhibits a non-random-looking regularity. The same kind of example can be given for nth-order entropy for any n (for discussion, see Attneave, 1959) .
Finally, to foreshadow the experiments in this paper, we first compare the discrimination versus identification of random and non-random stimuli. The results demonstrate systematic discrepancies between the two, revealing bias that exists in people's conceptual understanding of randomness but not in their perception. Our final study seeks to probe conceptual understanding via a critical test of Falk and Konold (1997) 's encoding hypothesis, which claims that people base their judgments of randomness on the ease of memory encoding.
Experiment 1
Participants Forty undergraduates (28 female, mean age 19.6 yrs, SD = 0.7) from Princeton University participated in exchange for course credit.
Materials
Stimuli were 60 × 60 matrices made up of green and blue dots. Each matrix (subtending ∼ 8.5 visual degrees) could be divided either horizontally or vertically into equal halves (the orientation was randomly determined). One of the halves was fully random whereas the other was created from a sequence with a given switch rate x. The latter sequence was used to populate either successive rows or successive columns of the half-matrix (counterbalanced). All matrices were generated separately ("on the fly"). Figure 1a provides six examples. In one condition of the experiment, the two halves were separated by a visible 50-pixel gap, and were presented either side by side (vertical division) or top and bottom (horizontal division).
Procedure
There were two conditions in the experiment: discrimination and identification. Participants were randomly assigned to each. Matrices in the discrimination condition were presented without a gap between the two halves, whereas those in the identification condition contained a gap. In the discrimination condition (N = 20), participants received the following instruction:
Each matrix can be divided into two halves either horizontally or vertically. The two halves are generated from different processes. Your task is to judge the orientation of the boundary between the two halves, by pressing "v" key for vertical or "h" key for horizontal.
Critically, no mention was made of randomness, probability, or related concepts in the instructions. In the identification condition (N = 20), participants received the following instruction:
Each matrix is divided into two halves either horizontally or vertically. The two halves are separated by a gap. One half is generated from a random process and the other half from a non-random process. Your task is to identify which half is more likely to be produced by a random process than a non-random process. You can press the top or bottom arrow key if the division is horizontal, and left or right if vertical.
In both conditions, the switch rate used for half of the matrix varied from 0 (homogeneous) to 1 (checkerboard) by 0.02, resulting in 51 levels, while the other half of the matrix was random (i.e., switch(.5)). Each level was repeated 10 times, making up 510 trials. The order of the trials was randomized for every participant. For each trial, the matrix (or the two separate halves) appeared on the screen for 1500 ms.; the screen then remained blank until response. No feedback regarding judgment accuracy was provided.
Results and Discussion
For each participant in both conditions, the average discrimination and identification accuracy at every switch rate was calculated, then grand means were calculated by averaging across participants. Results are shown in Figure 1b . Overall, as the non-random half of the matrix became more random (i.e., switch rate closer to .5), both discrimination and identification accuracy decreased.
The correlation between discrimination and identification accuracy across all levels of switch rate was r(49) = 0.91, p < .001. The correlation was maintained when considering just low switch rates (≤ .5) or high switch rates(≥ .5), with r(23) = 0.92, and r(23) = 0.91, respectively, p < .001.
Pooling all switch rates,discrimination accuracy (87.4%) was reliably higher than identification accuracy (75.4%) [t(100) = 3.56, p < .001]. This held for switch rates ≤ .5 (88.7% vs. 74.8%; t(48) = 3.20, p < .01), and for switch rates ≥ .5 (87.3% vs. 77.1%; t(48) = 2.00, p = .05). For 32 out of 51 levels of switch rate, discrimination accuracy was reliably higher than identification accuracy [for each of these 32 levels, t(38) > 2.12, p < .05].
At the same time, discrimination performance was reliably above chance (50%) for switch rates ≤ 0.42 (accuracy = 65.5%, t(19) = 4.61, p < .001), as well as for switch rates ≥ 0.56 (accuracy = 59.0%, t(19) = 2.54, p = .02). By contrast, identification performance was reliably above chance only for switch rates ≤ 0.38 (accuracy = 61.0%, t(19) = 2.17, p = .04), and ≥ 0.62 (accuracy = 58.5%, t(19) = 2.82, p = .01). Thus, participants experienced difficulty for a wider range of switch rates when performing identification compared to discrimination. Specifically, for x between 0.38 and 0.42, and between 0.56 and 0.62, participants could reliably distinguish random from non-random stimuli but nonetheless were unable to identify which was random. These results are inconsistent with Hypothesis (1), which asserts that the probability of correctly identifying stimuli as random coincides with the ease of distinguishing random from non-random stimuli.
Moreover, when switch rate was 0.56, identification accuracy was 40.0%, which is reliably below chance [t(19) = 3.01, p < .01]. Thus, participants consistently chose the switch(.56) matrices as more random than truly random matrices whereas discrimination performance for the same switch rate was reliably above chance. 1 More generally, Figure 1b reveals that the identification curve was shifted to the right compared to discrimination (which was easier than identification, and also less biased by alternation). Once again, these results are contrary to Hypothesis (1).
Robustness of Results
One follow-up study can be briefly noted here. With 20 new participants we performed a replication of the identification procedure of Experiment 1 except that participants were asked to identify which half is more likely to be produced by a non-random process rather than a random one (thereby reversing the framing of the question). Mean identification accuracy across participants and switch rates was 75.3%, that is, virtually indistinguishable from the identification condition in Experiment 1 (75.4%, t(38) = 0.04, p = .96). There was also a strong correlation of identification accuracy across switch rates between the two experiments [r(49) = 0.97, p < .001].
The results suggest that framing has minimal influence on identification.
Feedback
It has been found that performance in both randomness generation and evaluation can be improved by feedback. For example, Rapoport and Budescu (1992) devised a competitive game that led participants to generate outputs that were increasingly random. Similarly, trial-by-trial feedback can eliminate certain biases associated with the conception of randomness; these include the Gambler's Fallacy and more generally, exaggerated expectation of alternation between outcomes (Edwards, 1968; Neuringer, 1986) . However, the benefits of feedback have not been universal, for example, Budescu (1987) failed to find evidence for learning in a generation task.
It is thus unclear whether feedback can improve the conception of randomness here, and it is entirely unclear whether it will improve perceptual discrimination as has been found in other areas of perceptual learning (e.g., Goldstone, 1998; Pevtzow and Harnad, 1997) . We therefore conducted an additional follow-up study with 80 new participants to determine whether feedback would alter discrimination and identification performance.
Twenty participants performed the boundary discrimination task and 20 performed the identification task without feedback, as in Experiment 1. Another 20 participants performed the discrimination task with feedback on every trial; the remaining 20 performed the identification task with feedback. Results are shown in Figure 2 .
The results of the no-feedback conditions again closely replicate the findings of Experiment 1. More important, though, are the effects of feedback. For discrimination, there was no difference between feedback and no-feedback groups across switch rates [t(100) = 0.30, p = .77]. This was true for switch rates ≤ 0.5 [t(50) = 0.17, p = .86], and ≥ 0.5 [t(50) = 0.24, p = .81]. For identification, in contrast, accuracy was reliably higher when feedback was provided than when no feedback was provided [t(100) = 3.21, p = .002]. This was true for switch rates ≤ 0.5 [t(50) = 2.47, p = .02], and marginal for switch rates ≥ 0.5 [t(50) = 1.90, p = .06]. Moreover, identification performance rose to the level of perceptual discrimination when feedback was provided [t(100) = 0.22, p = .82]. In this sense, Hypothesis (1) appears to be true for trained participants. These results further highlight the difference between discrimination and identification. The latter can be tuned to the expression "random;" no tuning is apparent for discrimination.
An Ideal Observer
We ran a simulation to gauge how well an ideal observer would perform on the matrices used in our tasks. For discrimination, the switch rate for each of the four potential halves of a given matrix was computed (once traversing across rows and again traversing across columns). The ideal observer decided how the matrix was divided based on the maximum difference in switch rates between halves. For example, if the difference between left and right halves was greater than that between top and bottom (using the traversal direction that maximizes this difference), the boundary was declared vertical.
For identification, the switch rate for the two (separated) halves was computed. The ideal observer decided which half looked more random based on the minimum deviation of switch rate from 0.5 (fully random). Again, this comparison was made using both horizontal and vertical traversal; the traversal that minimized the deviation from 0.5 was used to declare that a given half was random. For example, given left and right halves, if the left was closer to 0.5 using the traversal that minimized the deviation, then the left half was declared random. The ideal observer performance is plotted across switch rates in Figure 2 . The mean accuracy for discrimination was 97.2% (SD = 9.4%) and the accuracy for identification was 98.2% (SD = 7.4%). The two performances were not reliably different [t(100) = 0.62, p = .54]. In other words, the two tasks are objectively "equally hard."
We then computed each participant's efficiency: the ratio of the participant's performance to that of the ideal observer. For discrimination, the efficiency was 88.5% (SD = 14.4%) with feedback and 87.3% (SD = 14.7%) without feedback, not reliably different [t(100) = 0.39, p = .70]. For identification, the efficiency was 86.7% (SD = 16.5%) with feedback and 75.9% (SD = 15.0%) without feedback, which were reliably different [t(100) = 3.47, p < .001]. Moreover, there was a reliable difference between discrimination and identification efficiency without feedback [t(100) = 3.89, p < .001], but not with feedback [t(100) = 0.56, p = .58].
Experiment 2
The second experiment aimed to generalize the findings by using a very different kind of stimulus: a dynamic random walk. This stimulus has a temporal component in that information about past outcomes is present only to the extent that it has contributed to the current, global state of the walk. Information about the local, step-by-step outcomes are available only via memory. This makes the stimulus interesting in light of recent emphasis on the role of short-term memory in judgment and generation of random sequences (Hahn and Warren, 2009 ; for older work emphasising the role of short-term memory specifically in sequence generation, see Baddeley, 1966; Wagenaar, 1972; Kareev, 1992; Rapoport and Budescu, 1997; Rabin, 2002) . The dynamic nature of the stimulus is also of interest because the majority of past work on randomness judgments has used static displays. Dynamic stimuli not only extend the range of ecologically relevant stimuli, but also connect well with many of the key tasks in which randomness is presumed to play a functional role in the real world such as predator evasion or foraging behaviors.
Participants
A new group of forty undergraduates (27 female, mean age 19.8 yrs, SD = 0.8) from Princeton University participated in exchange for course credit.
Materials
A horizontal line (subtending ∼ 2.5 visual degrees) was presented in each quadrant of a computer screen. A given segment could rotate clockwise or counterclockwise with respect to its fixed left end (like an hour hand started at 3 o'clock). The direction of the rotation was determined by the next member of a given bit string (10 • clockwise versus 10 • counterclockwise). The movements in a quadrant will be called its "walk." The four quadrants could be divided horizontally or vertically (randomly determined) into two halves. The two walks in one half were fully random, and those in the other half followed switch(x) sequences at a given switch rate x. For the identification condition, the boundary between the two halves was marked by a black line. See Figure 3a . All walks were freshly generated for each trial. Sample trials can be seen at http://www.princeton.edu/ e jiayingz/experiments.html.
Procedure
As in Experiment 1, there were two conditions: discrimination and identification, to which participants were randomly assigned. In the discrimination condition (N = 20), participants were informed that the four walks could be divided into left and right halves, or top and bottom halves, based on the way they moved. Specifically, either the left two walks would move in a different fashion from the right two walks, or the top two walks would move differently from the bottom two walks. The participants had to judge the orientation of the boundary between the two halves.
No mention was made of randomness in the instructions.
In the identification condition (N = 20), participants were informed that one half of the walks -indicated by the visible boundary -would move differently from the other half. Specifically, it was explained that for two of the lines whether the line moved clockwise or counter-clockwise on a given movement was randomly determined; for the other two lines, the walks would be non-random. The participant was asked to identify which half moved randomly.
As before, there were 51 levels of switch rate, varying by 0.02 from 0 (uniform sweep around the dial) to 1 (jiggling around the initial position). Each level was repeated twice, making up 102 trials. 2 The order of the trials was randomized for every participant. For each trial, the line started at the 3 o'clock position. Each successive position (10 • displacement) was presented for 100 ms. followed by a 50 ms. inter-movement interval. Each walk contained 100 movements, occurring simultaneously in the four quadrants. A trial lasted 15 seconds followed by a 1 second interval. If the participant responded within the 1 second interval, the trial was allowed to finish; otherwise, the screen remained blank until response. No feedback regarding judgment accuracy was provided.
Results and Discussion
For each participant, the average discrimination or identification accuracy at every switch rate was computed, and these were averaged into grand means. Results are shown in Figure 3b Averaging across all switch rates, discrimination accuracy (71.6%) was reliably higher than identification accuracy (57.1%; t(100) = 4.52, p < .001). The difference appears when isolating switch rates ≤ 0.5 (74.3% vs. 53.9%; t(48) = 4.69, p < .001), as well as for switch rates ≥ 0.5 (69.8% vs. 60.3%; t(48) = 2.00, p = .05). For 19 of the 51 levels of switch rate, discrimination accuracy was reliably higher than identification accuracy [for each of these 19 levels, t(38) > 2.04, p < .05].
Finally, discrimination performance was reliably above chance for switch rates ≤ 0.38 and also for rates ≥ 0.80 (coincidentally, the same accuracy was achieved in the two cases: accuracy = 70.0%, t(19) = 2.99, p < .01). In comparison, identification performance was reliably above chance only for switch rates ≤ 0.04 (accuracy = 77.5%, t(19) = 3.58, p < .01), and for rates ≥ 0.92 (accuracy = 72.5%, t(19) = 2.65, p = .02). Thus, participants experienced difficulty for In both conditions, the four quadrants could be divided into two halves: in one half the two walks were fully random, and in the other the two walks followed a sequence at a given switch rate. In the identification condition, a black line indicated the boundary between the two halves. (b) Discrimination and identification accuracy are plotted as a function of switch rate. The blue line indicates chance performance (0.5).
a much wider range of switch rates when performing identification compared to discrimination. Specifically, for switch rates between 0.04 and 0.38, and between 0.80 and 0.92, participants could reliably distinguish random from non-random walks but were unable to identify which was random. Once again, the results are inconsistent with Hypothesis (1) that the ability to identify random from non-random stimuli corresponds to the ability to perceptually distinguish between the two.
The worst identification performance was at switch rate 0.58, yielding an accuracy of 20.0%, reliably below chance [t(19) = 3.94, p < .001]. Notice the proximity of the switch rates with the lowest identification accuracy in Experiments 1 and 2 (0.56 and 0.58, respectively). Both are consistent with past findings, revealing that switch rates around 0.60 are most likely to attract the "random" label (e.g., Bakan, 1960; Budescu, 1987; Diener and Thompson, 1985; Falk, 1975) .
As in Experiment 1, we ran an ideal observer analysis on the walks. For discrimination, the switch rate for each walk was first computed and the switch rates for two walks making up each of the four potential halves were then averaged. The ideal observer discriminated the boundary based on the maximum difference between the two halves. For identification, the switch rate for each walk was computed and then averaged across two walks in one half. The ideal observer chose the half which looked random based on the minimum deviation of switch rate from 0.5 (fully random). The ideal observer performance is plotted across switch rates in Figure 3b . The mean accuracy for discrimination was 93.7% (SD = 12.0%) and the accuracy for identification was 92.7% (SD = 15.6%). They were not reliably different [t(100) = 0.36, p = .72].
Overall, the results of Experiment 2 replicated those in Experiment 1, despite the disparity in stimuli used. One notable difference is that the discrimination curve in Experiment 2 was flatter, and identification failed for a much wider range of switch rates (see Figure 3b) . The difference may hinge on the dynamic vs. static contrast, the former making more demands on working memory.
Robustness: Alternative Randomness Judgment Tasks
The identification task based on binary choice (i.e., labeling one half as "random") in our experiments thus far has been used in other studies (e.g., Hsu et al., 2010) . Arguably more common, however, have been tasks that ask participants to rate the randomness of stimuli on a scale. It is thus interesting to also examine randomness ratings for both the matrices and the walks.
In a follow-up study, 20 new participants were presented with half-matrices exhibiting a given switch rate, and asked to rate how random the matrix looked on a scale from 0 to 100 (0 being completely non-random, 100 being completely random). Another 20 participants were presented with two walks governed by a given switch rate, and asked to rate how random the two walks appeared (using the same scale). The average ratings of the matrices and the walks are shown in Figure 4 .
For matrices, we correlated the average rating at a given switch rate with the absolute difference between that switch rate and .5 (perfect randomness). The correlation was r(49) = −0.90, p < .001, suggesting that ratings carry considerable information about degree of randomness. For walks, the same correlation was r(49) = −0.83, p < .001. The correlation between the matrix rating versus identification performance at the same switch rate in Experiment 1 was r(49) = −0.79, p < .001; for walks, the correlation was r(49) = −0.75, p < .001. These strong correlations suggest good correspondence between the two types of measure, revealing sensitivity of randomness identification paradigm in use. The data for the random walk are much noisier (as they were for both our other tasks with this stimulus as well). The graph for the matrix data, however, shows qualitative evidence of over-alternation bias through the asymmetric, leftward shift along the horizontal axis, and visually corresponds to the findings of Falk and Konold (1997, see e.g., their Figures 3, 5, and 6 ). 
Experiment 3
It seems that participants possess a conceptual bias of randomness which extends across very different types of stimulus. Consistent with past work (Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar, 1991), we find that people tend to identify over-alternating stimuli as "random." Our results also indicate that this bias is not present in perception. What, then, underlies the over-alternation bias?
There are several proposals. First, people may hold a mistaken belief that random sources provide an equilibrium process, whereby equi-probable outcomes must "balance out" and hence runs must self-correct, thus giving rise to the gambler's fallacy. Such a belief could stem from a failure to distinguish between sampling with replacement and sampling without replacement (e.g., Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar, 1991; Ayton et al., 1989) . When sampling without replacement, each repeat of an outcome makes a switch more likely, due to depletion, thus biasing against longer runs. It has been argued not only that people may have more experience of sampling without replacement in the real world, but Hahn and Warren (2009) have demonstrated recently that, given a likely model of how people experience random sequences, sampling with and without replacement are surprisingly difficult to distinguish on the basis of experience alone.
Specifically, Hahn and Warren (2009) demonstrated how short-term memory limitations may impact both generation and perception of random sequences. While all possible sequences of length n are equally likely as outcomes of n flips of a coin, they are not equally likely as (local) subsequences within a longer (global) sequence: If one starts flipping a coin, the average number of coin tosses one has to wait before encountering the sequence HHHH is considerably longer than the average wait time for the sequence HHHT. Given human short-term memory limitations, the actual experience of unfolding sequences will be akin to a fixed-length sliding window moving through the overall data stream, both in sequence production and perception. The local subsequences that appear in that moving window differ in how they occur. Moreover, the corresponding experience of sampling with and without replacement is remarkably similar.
Furthermore, Kareev (1992) demonstrated that short sequences have higher alternation rates than do long sequences. Even an unbiased process generating short sequences will over-alternate. Kareev (1992) used this fact as the basis for explaining over-alternation in random sequence generation tasks: An agent with limited short-term memory will effectively be generating a long sequence of "random outputs" by stringing together short sequences which can be held in working memory (see Rapoport and Budescu (1997) for one way of modeling such a process), and consequently will exhibit over-alternations for long sequences. In other words, people may look like they exhibit the gambler's fallacy even when they do not, purely due to information processing limitations. In support, Kareev (1992) found correlations between alternation rates in sequence generation and working memory capacity. Hahn and Warren (2009) argued that the same fact may underlie a bias toward over-alternation in sequence judgment tasks on the assumption that people are seeking to match their experience. If that experience is based on statistics compiled over a short, sliding window, then over-alternations will characterize that experience.
A further proposal is that people underestimate how different, in statistical terms, short sequences are to long sequences. People may wrongly attribute long-run properties (as captured by the Law of Large Numbers) to both short and long sequences. This forms the basis of the representativeness account (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972) , which has been formalized both by Rapoport and Budescu (1997) and Rabin (2002) .
Finally, Falk and Konold (1997) provide an account related in spirit to theoretical notions of randomness based on compression and algorithmic complexity. The more structure or regularity a sequence contains, the more compactly it can be represented (e.g., 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 1 as 20 1's) , and hence, the greater the compression afforded relative to enumeration of the sequence itself. This forms the basis of formal definitions of randomness as incompressibility. For x = .5, a switch(x) sequence will often be more compressible than a fully random string [switch(.5)], in the sense of being generated by shorter programs in an intuitively reasonable programming language (Li and Vitányi, 2008) . 3 This can also be used to motivate a psychological process account of randomness judgment. Specifically, Falk and Konold (1997) suggest that the tendency for a given pattern to be classified as "random" varies with the cognitive difficulty the judge experiences in encoding the pattern. Sequences with greater internal structure, such as repetition or symmetry will be easier to en-code, and thus perceived as less random. It is also these properties that make sequences more compressible, a connection that has been drawn out in several areas of cognition (see Chater, 1999; van der Helm and Leeuwenberg, 1996) . Falk and Konold (1997) also provided experimental evidence for this account. In their studies they found a direct relation between the time participants needed in order to memorize a given bit string and participants' judgment of "how likely it is that such a sequence was obtained by flipping a fair coin." Not all accounts just outlined seem equally applicable to the experiments reported in this paper so far. In particular, it is unclear that "representativeness" would apply, given that the random matrices, at least, contain comparatively large amounts of data. This leaves the general idea that either over-alternation is (falsely) presumed to be a characteristic of longer sequences due broadly to past experience or Falk and Konold (1997) 's memory encoding account. We thus sought to test the encoding account in the next experiment. Falk and Konold (1997) tested the following:
(2) Encoding hypothesis: The probability that a given bit string is judged "random" varies directly with the time needed to memorize or copy it.
As just noted, they found that memorization and copying difficulty predicted the "random" label quite well. Hypothesis (2) thus invites extension to other kinds of stimuli and additional measures of encoding difficulty. Specifically, in the present experiment we consider matrices rather than strings and detection of change rather than memorization. Same-different judgments provide a natural tool for probing memory encoding and are widely used to this effect (Grimes, 1996; Simons, 2000) . Hypothesis (2), may thus be extended as follows:
(3) Extended encoding hypothesis: The probability that a given matrix is judged "random" varies directly with the difficulty of detecting a change in the matrix.
To put Hypothesis (3) to a critical test, we constructed a type of matrix one half of which was fully random, the other half a mirror image of the first half. We reasoned that the precedence of global features in perception (Navon, 1977; Poljac et al., 2012) might lead participants to reject the "random" label for symmetrical matrices, but nonetheless to experience difficulty in processing individual bits (i.e., the matrix's local features). Specifically, the role of symmetry may change as a function of stimulus and memory task. Symmetry increases compressibility (through redundancy) which can be exploited in encoding, at least in circumstances where all aspects of the stimulus are faithfully remembered. However, much of everyday memory is arguably not like this. Memory encoding is not like taking a snapshot and there is a wealth of research to suggest that stimuli are typically encoded partially (see Rensink, 2002 for a review). Moreover, most day-to-day tasks such as recognition and identification arguably require only encoding only up to a level of detail that supports discrimination.
These considerations reveal a possible lack of sharpness in Falk and Konold's encoding hypothesis. Symmetry is a property that seems to be detected seemingly effortlessly and automatically in a wide variety of conditions (Wagemans, 1995) , and it is likely to have a strong influence on perceptions of randomness (see e.g., Hsu et al., 2010 ). Yet in the same way that it is only one of many structural features that support data compression (and hence algorithmic complexity), it is only one of many stimulus aspects that potentially influence ease of encoding. It is not enough, vis a vis the encoding hypothesis, to show that each of these features individually influences both randomness perception and ease of encoding. Rather, to be successful as the process theory as Falk and Konold's encoding account is intended to be, it must be the case that the specific degree to which such structural features influence encoding difficulty is matched by their degree of influence on judgments of randomness. Only then is the claim plausible that the one serves as a (process level) proxy for the other.
Moreover, if the account is to apply beyond the confines of the lab, randomness judgments must track encoding difficulty not only in the time course of faithful copying, but for other plausible measures of encoding as well, since we do not, in real-world circumstances, typically memorize every aspect of a stimulus.
In more naturalistic memory tasks, such as old-new recognition or sequential same-different judgment, ease of encoding may draw more strongly on some structural aspects than others, allowing potential dissociation between judgments of randomness (based on the presence or absence of structure) and memory performance. Our final experiment sought explicitly to test this.
Participants
A new group of forty undergraduates (27 female, mean age 20.5 yrs, SD = 1.6) from Princeton University participated in exchange for course credit.
Materials
Stimuli were 16 × 16 matrices (each subtending ∼ 5.7 visual degrees). Two kinds of matrices were generated. One kind was constructed identically to the switch(x) matrices of Experiment 1, for x ranging from 0.1 to 0.45 and from 0.55 to 0.9 in steps of 0.05. The second kind (called "mirror matrices") were generated by filling the upper triangle submatrix (including its diagonal) with random bits, and then reflecting the upper triangle around the diagonal to fill the bottom triangle with corresponding bits (see Figure 5a ). The choice of diagonal (top-left to bottom-right or topright to bottom-left) was made randomly. For both kinds of matrix [switch(x) 4 and mirrored], whether tiling proceeded horizontally or vertically was determined randomly. All matrices were generated individually for each trial.
Procedure
Participants were assigned randomly to one of two conditions: change detection and identification. In the change detection condition (N = 20), two matrices were presented serially and participants judged whether the matrices were the same or different. No mention was made of randomness. Half the time the two matrices were different (diversity trials), and half the time they were the same (identity trials). For diversity trials, the colors of 10 bits (randomly chosen) in the second matrix (of the two in a given trial) were inverted. The first matrix was either switch(x) for x in the range described above, or a mirror matrix. In individually randomized order, there were 10 diversity trials for every level of x plus 10 mirror diversity trials, and likewise 10 identity trials for every level of x plus 10 mirror identity trials -340 trials in total. Each trial started with a blank screen for 500 ms. Then the first matrix was presented until the participant pressed a button to proceed. 5 Five hundred milliseconds later the second matrix was presented until response. See Figure 5a .
In the identification condition (N = 20), each trial contained a switch(x) matrix and a mirror matrix, presented left to right (positions counterbalanced). Participants were asked to judge which matrix "looked random." The same levels of x as in the change detection condition were used for identification trials, each repeated 10 times. There were thus 160 trials, each comparing a switch to a mirror matrix. For each trial, a blank screen appeared for 500 ms. after which the two matrices were presented until response.
Results and Discussion
To examine the accuracy of change detection performance, d was computed for each participant for every switch rate as well as for the mirror matrices; averages were then computed over individual d s. The value of d for a given level of x measures the encodability of switch(x) matrices, and likewise for the mirror matrices. The probability of choosing the mirror matrix as random in the identification task was also computed for every switch rate. Results are shown in Figure 5b .
In change detection, for every switch rate x, d for mirror matrices was reliably lower than d for switch(x) matrices [t's(19) ≥ 2.14, p's ≤ .04]. This suggests that mirror matrices were more difficult to encode than were switch(x) matrices for all levels of x. In contrast, except for x = 0.85 and x = 0.9, the probability of choosing the mirror matrix as more "random" than the switch(x) matrix was reliably below the chance level of 0.5 [t's(19) ≥ 2.63, p's ≤ .01]. In other words, compared to mirror matrices, switch(x) matrices (except for extreme values of x) were perceived as more random. Indeed, in debriefing, every participant evoked symmetry as their reason not to label a matrix as "random." Thus, mirror matrices were harder to encode but less random in appearance compared to switch(x) matrices. These results are inconsistent with the extended encoding hypothesis (3).
By the same token, the results point broadly toward an experiential basis for the over-5 In a separate experiment we presented the first matrix for 500 ms, and obtained similar results. The left side plots change detection performance (d ) for every switch rate and also for mirror matrices (the red line shows d for mirror matrices). The right side shows the probability, for each switch rate, of choosing a mirror matrix "as random." The blue line indicates chance performance (50%). alternation bias (e.g., Hahn and Warren, 2009) , in keeping with recent findings by Hsu et al. (2010) that participants' judgments of randomness for simple 4-by-4 binary matrices reflected adjacency statistics derived from real world scenes. 6
General Discussion
Once again, let a random source R and a non-random source N be given. Experiments 1 and 2 bear on the claim -formulated as Hypothesis (1) -that the ability to identify the provenance of a stimulus drawn from R versus N is predicted by the ability to distinguish between the products of these two sources. In a word, if you can see the difference between R and N then you can see which is random; discrimination entails identification.
Our results reveal Hypothesis (1) to be inexact whether bit strings are rendered statically (Experiment 1) or dynamically (Experiment 2). In both cases, participants were better at discrimination than identification. In our experiments, participants were not informed of the generating process, but they nonetheless performed reasonably close to an ideal observer. Discrimination accuracy was symmetrically distributed around true randomness; that is, the probability of distinguishing a stimulus with switch rate .5 + δ was about equal to the probability for .5 − δ (see Figure 1 ). In contrast, identification was worst (and significantly below chance) for switch rate 0.56 in Experiment 1. Remarkably, it was worst (and far below chance) at essentially the same switch rate (0.58) in Experiment 2, involving radically different stimuli (see Figure 3) . Apparently, the lay concept of randomness does not fully exploit the perceptual resources available for discriminating random from non-random sources. The alternation bias noted by other investigators (Wagenaar, 1972; Kahneman and Tversky, 1972; Baddeley, 1966 ) thus appears to be fundamentally a conceptual phenomenon. This is further emphasised by the lack of effect that feedback had on discrimination performance. When feedback was provided, identification performance improved and matched discrimination performance. By contrast, the perceptual ability to distinguish random from non-random events was unaffected by feedback. This differential impact of feedback is more evidence for the psychological gulf between randomness perception from conception.
In Experiment 3, we evaluated the hypothesis of Falk and Konold (1997) according to which the tendency to label given stimuli as "random" can be predicted by their encoding difficulty. Matrices with a range of switch rates were compared to mirror matrices. We used a natural measure of encoding wherein participants detected a change between two matrices (similarly to Grimes, 1996; Simons, 2000) . The mirror matrices turned out to be more difficult to encode yet less likely to be labeled "random," in contradiction with the extended encoding hypothesis (3). To explain this finding, note that success in the encoding task requires local observation, namely, to determine whether a given cell in the matrix has switched bits. In contrast, judgments of "randomness" need to integrate the global feature of matrix symmetry, which strikes participants as non-random. Indeed, recent studies have highlighted the difference between global and local processing (Poljac et al., 2012; Zhao et al., 2011) . Thus, the encoding hypothesis (2) due to Falk and Konold (1997) does not appear to generalize to detecting changes in bit matrices.
In conclusion, although much past work has bemoaned the lay conception of randomness, the present paper provides a more nuanced assessment of people's capabilities in two ways. First, and most importantly, we distinguish between perceptual and conceptual understanding of randomness, and second, we compare human performance to that of an ideal observer. With regard to perception, our findings lead to a fairly positive picture. Moreover, a failure to further improve discrimination performance through feedback suggests that the limits of human performance in our tasks are reached. People are weaker in their conception of randomness. They benefited, however, from feedback, and performance rose to the level possible given the underlying discrimination ability.
In the real world, it is perhaps more important that we are able to distinguish between random and non-random sources than we understand the word "random," a theoretical term that itself is extremely complex. This is because the former bears on the critical ability of perceiving predictable structure in the environment. In light of this, it would seem overly negative to consider people to be misguided about randomness.
